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ABSTRACT 
It is well established that power is connected to networks, yet structural theories of power 
in network analysis fail to satisfy political sociologists. Centrality is generally put forward as a 
measure of power, but this is not enough for political sociology. This article puts forward a 
theory of power that brings power resources and power dependency theory to the study of social 
networks concerning political coalitions in an urban polity. Within this theory of power 
resources, we embed power theories based on dependence (exchange theories) with power being 
based on the inverse of the expected value of alternative courses of action, and social network 
analysis focused on networks of powerful actors with significant power resources. The use of 
social networks depends on the formation of coalitions of powerful individuals and groups who 
then engage in political bargaining with other coalitions who want a different outcome. This 
synthetic theory is illustrated with two examples of economic development and political conflict 
in a moderately sized city. 
Although power is one of sociology's favorite concepts in explaining class, race and 
gender differences, it proves to be a slippery concept (Roscigno, 2011). Often the proof that one 
group has more power than another is demonstrated by the use of power in producing a particular 
outcome. For instance, one corporation had the power to buy a city block and destroy all the 
historic buildings upon it, or during the Reagan administration the numerical majority of 
Republicans were able to force their will on the Democrats by passing stringent budget measures 
and tax cuts. Other uses of power in political sociology tend to view it as a capitalist constant so 
that the results are somewhat inevitable. Both of these approaches leave a heavy post hoc ergo 
propter hoc taste in the political sociologist's mouth. And bringing power to social networks has 
been a difficult affair with centrality being an attractive but at the same time somewhat 
frustrating concept - necessary but agonizingly insufficient because centrality lacks content. 
Some post-modem conceptions of power even see it in a circular structure that leaves an 
evanescent wisp that is difficult to track down (Dyberg, 1997). While we do not argue against 
these approaches, we focus more on the mechanisms of power in an a priori way that could 
predict power both before it is used and as a variable in different contexts and circumstances. 
Consequently, this paper will provide a synthesis of three theories of power - power 
resources, power dependency, and network centrality theories - to conceptualize a synthetic 
approach to power in a political setting. It will then analyze two case studies of economic and 
political development in a city context between business, the govermnent, the media and grass 
roots social movements. We will try to show a more complex view of power that provides what 
some previous theories have lacked. This is a measure of power with beliefs about the future and 
assessments of current material forces embedded in a relational structure of networks that can 
explain major outcomes in city politics. 
1 
Theories of Power and Politics 
Four theories of power have been important in looking at competing groups in cities: 
elite theory, power resources theory, power dependence theory, and network power theories. 
I-Elite studies of Power in the US began with Floyd Hunter's (1953) elite theory applied 
to the city of Atlanta using a reputational approach to the "real" holders of power rather than 
those in obvious official positions. His structural-functional approach mapped the hierarchies and 
interconnected webs of business, political and religious elites. The study promoted a large scale 
examination of elite social networks. C. Wright Mills' book The Power Elite claimed a new 
perspective on systems of power in the US. He identified three power groups - political, 
economic and military- that formed a shifting coalition of power wielding elites and institutions 
that ruled the US. Mills saw this group being created by rationalization in all advanced industrial 
societies. The mechanisms of power are concentrated in the hands of a limited but corrupt group, 
but Mills was not a great gatherer of evidence. In the 1969 Ralph Miliband put forth a theory of 
elite power based on networks of elite power holders in the UK. His network approach, not 
unlike Hunter's work, was excoriated by Ni cos Poulantzas who indicated that its nai:ve 
positivism of social networks held no meaningful explanation of power in advanced 
industrialized societies. Miliband attempted to defend his position (1972), but the largely 
theoretical and rather non-empirical neo-Marxist work of Poulantzas ruled the day (1973, 1978). 
Capital in the last instance had more power than mere social networks. Network studies 
continued to be done, especially of corporate board membership, but these studies were much 
less ambitious than the original elite theorists. Domhoffs early work (1967) was quite popular 
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but was much criticized in the 1980s, and since then he (1998, 2010) has increased its rigor using 
social networks and decreased some of the scope of his claims. By and large, we find elite theory 
to be on the right track but too vague about the mechanisms of power. 
2-Power Resources Theory. Power resources theory emerged from studies of the 
welfare state most often with a quasi-Marxist focus (Korpi 1982, 1985; Berg and Janoski, 2005). 
It focuses on who has more a priori resources than others and hence more power in determining a 
later event. Mary Rogers (1974) distinguished between infra-resources that allow one entry into 
the use of a resource, and instrumental resources that are the actual exercise of power. For 
instance, she mentions that knowing a large number of people can lead to your subsequently 
gaining access to and then persuading a particularly powerful person ( with power resources) to 
act in your behalf. This leads to an insight that social networks may be infra-resources but not the 
actual instrumental resource itself. She also indicates that both of these types of resources are 
embedded within social systems. However, the practice of power resources theory has not picked 
up on Rogers lead into social networks. Most studies using power resources measure the political 
power of left parties (seats, executive and cabinets) or the strength of unions in leading to 
welfare state, economic, and immigration policies (Korpi 1982, 1985; Shalev 1983, 1992; Huber 
and Stephens, 2001; Janoski, 2010). Other studies focus on money collected by each political 
party in an election cycle, and some look at the profits of capitalist businesses. The only focus 
that comes close to social networks concerns the coalition formation process that takes place 
after an election, and these studies measure the distribution of cabinet seats in the final coalition 
(Esping-Andersen 1985; Baldwin 1990; Hicks 2000; van Kersbergen 1996). But on the whole, 
social networks and valued alternatives as resources tend to be ignored. 
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3-Power Dependency Theory. Exchange theory has little to say directly about political 
sociology; however, it is rich in concepts of power that can be applied to political conflict. If one 
looks beyond the micro-interactionist framework, exchange theory provides a clear theory of 
political power being based on dependence. The basic elements of power are laid out by Richard 
Emerson who died at an untimely and early age. The most political statement of exchange theory 
power in a directly conflictual situation comes from Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler 
(1980, 1981; see also Molm, 1985). The A has more power than B when Bis more dependent. 
This can be expressed as !/(sum of the valued alternatives ofB) being greater than 1/(sum of the 
valued alternatives of A). The first term is higher and A is more powerful when B has fewer 
alternatives than A. 
(1) Powera 
(i.e., fewer alternatives for B means more power for A, 
more alternatives for B mean less power for A.) 
(2) Powen, I I I Altai *Va1 ... Altan *V n 
(3) Net power of A over B = Powera / Powen, 
= [ IAita1*Va1 ... Altan*Vn] / [ IAltb1*Vb1 ... Altbn*Vn] 
When the net power of A is greater than 1, A has more power, and when net power of A is less 
than I, B has more power. This approach to power can be measured by searching out the 
alternatives that A and B might have and taking their expected values (the subjective probability 
of occurrence times the value of that occurrence). In terms of power resources theory, power 
would be based on having greater net expected values of more numerous and valuable 
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alternatives. This can be transferred to group bargaining with labor and management (as done by 
Bacharach and Lawler), or political conflict in a community (as we do here). Refinements to this 
strategy can be seen in the more recent exchange literature (Schaefer, 2009; Toye, 2000), but 
again, they are oriented toward micro-interaction and not group politics. Social exchange theory 
has little to say about social networks, though some of it has extended into generalized exchange 
among more than two people. However, it is a very short step to say that many more and valued 
alternatives could be gained from information and contacts generated by larger social networks. 
4-Power in Social Networks: Scott Feld (1981) finds some previous approaches to 
social networks have to be "atheoretical" or "self-contained," and as a result, have not connected 
to the larger context of business, government, and other interest groups. For instance, measuring 
the individual centrality of individuals within a given network might tell who in a network is 
likely to have more power, but that "self-contained network" information is not useful to most 
political sociology studies. Larger coalitions, as described by Logan and Molotch (1987, 2007) 
shows how place entrepreneurs and government officials can form important coalitions. Holistic 
networks, sometimes represented by coalitions, are much better than egocentric networks, 
whether they are for individuals or political groups. If extensive network information is 
available, one can use this broader type of network structure such as eigenvector centrality 
(EVC) to measure the importance of a group node in a coalition network (Bonacich 1972). EVC 
attempts to discover powerful actors by examining what actors are the most connected to other 
well-connected actors. But this type of detailed network information is not always available. 
This is relevant to power especially in organizational settings because oftentimes power 
lies with individuals who have access to other members in the network, but may not connected to 
everyone themselves (as in simple degree centrality). To better illustrate this consider the chief 
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executive officer of a large corporation. Centrality measures other than EVC may not identify the 
CEO as 'central' because he or she might only speak to 6 top level managers. However, 
eigenvector would capture that the CEO, despite their degree centrality of only 6 was the most 
'central' actor because of the connections of his or her top level managers that take into 
consideration their more numerous connections. 
In measuring EVC, relative scores are assigned to all nodes in the network based on the 
principle that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in 
question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. For example, college football team 
evaluators compute a "ratings percentage index" (RPI) of each team based on their past networks 
of 10 or so opponents in a season. The RPI consists of a percentage of a team's wins and losses 
record, a percentage of this team's opponents' average winning percentage, and even a 
percentage of the team's opponent's opponent's winning percentage. The last two items 
constitute the team's "strength of schedule" irrespective of how well the team does (i.e., they 
could have tough schedule whether they win or lose all their games). 
In political contests, groups in coalitions have rough equivalents of RPI measures. 
Although they do not have clear schedules of games, they do have conflicts where two types of 
resources are important: 
( 1) financial power resources in terms of money and credit, and 
(2) networks of people that will produce voters inclined to vote one way or another and 
for some to actually participate in the political process. 
As a result of the differences in group resources based on money and votes embedded in social 
networks, those with the greater resources most often play a primary leadership or causal role in 
determining the direction of politics and the ultimate results of various political bargaining 
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processes. In policy debates and legislative action to pass actual laws, a metric between money 
and people is hard to determine. But clearly some interest groups are more powerful than others-
namely, business groups control much larger pools of monetary resources, political parties and 
leaders have some control over voters, and neighborhood social networks allow various deals to 
be made with grass roots groups and these other parties. 
Synthesizing Three Theories 
In putting this theory together, the different epistemological standings of these last three 
/3olllr.l1 "'i, ., 01 
theories need to be taken into account in two ways. First, power resources theory is somewhat ~;/,,,p. 
oriented toward the past or present. In a legislature, it is often measured by political party power, ~ l 
• •• 
which was determined in the most recent but still 'past' electio Second, with power 
dependency theory, the calculation of the number of alternatives and their values is a somewhat 
counterfactual endeavor that largely occurs in the future. One can have an alternative that he/she 
may or may not take advantage of with differing probabilities of success in obtaining different 
amounts of value. One can also bluff concerning the realism of these alternatives. Thus, the basis 
of power dependency is in the future, though not totally speculative. While "counterfactuality" is 
not precise, it does signal what may happen in the future (most often near future) rather than a 
post-power result. And people act on the basis of their expectations or predicted estimates. 
In this paper we take examples of political competition in a moderately sized city. While 
politics are nominally non-partisan, there exist clear liberal and conservative blocks. We 
operationalize political competition first through power resources theory, and then using 
exchange theory with subjective probability estimations of outcomes. In figure 1, the principal 
competitors for political power to accept a particular policy are capital, local grass roots groups, 
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and local government with the possibility that the public sphere could be activated by the media 
(i.e., local and national business or capital as B1 and Bn, local and national state government as S1 
and Sn, local and national grass roots groups as GR1 and GRn, and local and national media as M1 
and Mn). 
********** Figure 1 about here********** 
Each local actor is potentially connected to a national actor that is not directly involved in local 
policy debate (B1->Bn, S1->Sn, GR1->GRn, and M1->Mn), and whether the national actors 
become involved can be an important mobilization issue ( e.g., see the immigration debates in 
Arizona that involve the federal government's lack of enforcement). Each local actor is 
connected to various power resources of money, people (votes), and publics (public opinion and 
social networks) depending on their choice of policy alternatives. 
The comparative alternatives and values from exchange theory are added in Figure 2, as 
are the comparative resources in people and money from power resources theory. 
********** Figure 2 about here********** 
This makes the diagram much more complicated, but it also clearly shows that the resources and 
alternatives are quite imbalanced. Clearly, local actors have fewer alternatives than national 
actors, but among each local and national set, business has the most alternatives followed by 
political actors. Local grass roots and status groups have the fewest alternatives since they have 
the fewest monetary connections. However, they do have high potential people and public 
connections. On the basis of resources that can be initially mobilized, business should get its 
way. @SNP 
However, each group is not assuredly unified or even capable of being unified. Each 
'fhird. , I #I 
group is challenged by the building of coalitions among themselves. This is how social networks 
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need to be assessed for business, grassroots, state and public sphere. Social networks enter into 
the political bargaining process in three ways: (1) through the generation of valued alternatives, 
-::: . 
(2) through the formation and maintenance of coalitions, and (3) the public sphere needs to be - -~ ~ 
brought on board or kept out of the fray. 
The first process is the generation and promotion of valued alternatives. Although some (1) 
alternatives are easily apparent (i.e., the old and tired ones of doing nothing or doing what has 
been done many times before with weak results), good alternatives with high value are not easily 
found. Alternatives must be recognized and packaged as being relevant to a group's experiences. 
Feld's focus theory is important here in bringing numbers of people together to emphasize a 
possible solution or strategy. The point of focus theory is that a social network needs a number of 
foci (see also the cognitive literature on 'anchors' and social movement literature on 'framing'), 
and for a political network to thrive this focus must be discovered, it must be sold to the network, 
and to continue on, it needs to work reasonably well (Feld, 1981: 1019-20). Feld does not 
provide any political examples, but he does characterize this creation of alternatives or foci as 
loosely connected clusters that resonate within a larger context that then finds them useful. As 
these foci are used and are extended over time, the clusters become a bit more tightly connected 
and their creators or adopters gain centrality. However, it is important to note that the focus 
leaders did not start out with centrality as they thrived in loosely connected networks. 
The second process of social networks is at a more aggregate level. It concerns how the (?) 
social networks sort out the many different types of foci within their loosely connected views in 
an organization, and then how organizations sort out their commonalities and differences in 
establishing coalitions among themselves to gain a particular policy or political outcome. 
Alternatives made for some clusters may not fit well with other clusters so they need to be 
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translated, resonances enhanced, and bridges made (Feld, 1981: 1022-24). This too requires 
creative energy in bringing about a larger focus or vision that binds different clusters in an 
organization, and different groups in a coalition. 
The third process involves the media and public opinion. The media are usually pro- Qs) 
business but they can tum against various projects. Business has public relations departments to 
manage this, but various social movement cause can create news and highlight various injustices 
involved. How the media and public opinion are managed can be critical to the outcomes. 
Two political controversies and two somewhat counterfactual conflicts are mapped out in 
Figure 3, which allows us to examine both existing and hegemonic coalitions in Lexington, 
Kentucky, a city of250,000 people. 
********** Figure 3 about here********** 
In item a, a counterfactual pattern of coalitions is mapped out concerning the building of a large 
mall in North Lexington, which is strongly recognized as horse farm country. This coalition 
would bring national business and media together (Bn and Mn), but it would be massively 
opposed by local elites especially from the horse industry, not to mention grass roots groups (B1, 
Sn, S1, M1). This coalition would be easily and quickly defeated if it were proposed. On the other 
hand, in item c, the proposal to build a large shopping center in south Lexington near Interstate 
1-75 was passed and quickly built without much trouble (i.e., the 300 acre Hamburg Pavilion). 
This coalition brought both levels of capital, both levels of government, and general media 
support to the table (Bn, B1, Sn, S1, Mn, M1) and grass roots groups never really mobilized to 
oppose it (GRn and GR1). The two issues actually debated come under two different political 
administrations: Mayor Teresa Isaacs' liberal and Mayor James Newberry's business-oriented 
administrations. The two issues covered are the city taking over the private water supply 
10 
corporation by eminent domain, and the building of a major hotel and shops covering a whole 
city block entailing the condemnation of a large number of businesses. Item b diagrams the 
city/county's plan to condemn and then buy the private water company, and item d shows the 
Centre Pointe controversy over destroying a city block and building a skyscraper hotel. These 
two cases represent difficult coalition formation issues, which are the focus of this paper. .J ....A--,---t . 
Three principles are important for coalitionformation.f!!.irst, large~oalitions generally 
prevail over smaller coalitions.@econd, the local actors who can mobilize their larger state and 
national counterparts will have more power.{!hird, the coalitions must be weighted by their 
power resources which are measured by the number of alternatives with a high probability of 
occurring and with a high value. Thus, it is critical to know if business at the local and 
state/national levels, government at both levels, and the grass roots at both levels (labor, gender, 
or ethnic areas) can be mobilized for a cause and how they form coalitions with powerful others. 
The~onrth aspect of social networks is that the message can be spread throughout the public 
sphere, or the public sphere can be neutralized so that the issue is barely covered. This coalition 
- c~ .... ~ \e.o.deo;. size is not enough and power resources must be included. r 
The next level of putting it together involves connecting the coalitions to social 
networks that connect to the power resources that each group controls. Each actor (i.e., B1, Bn, 
S1, Sn .... etc.) is not monolithic but consists of social networks converging (or not converging) 
on various alternatives with different values of outcomes. The actual process of coalition 
formation then requires both coalition size and their power resources. Social networks are 
intimately intertwined with the ability to create alternatives with high probabilities of occurring 
that will produce high values or resources. Thus, the networks are involved within possible 
bargaining actors (Bn) and between them (Bn and Sn) and their many or few alternatives. Local 
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power brokers have been shown to be networked through series of board memberships, board 
memberships, and affiliations with clubs, charitable organizations, or other social foci (Hunter 
1953, Domhoff 1978). These ties are not constantly mobilized by actors who seek to alter policy 
but they present a range of alternatives that more powerful actors can use. It also leads to more 
multiplex relations oflocal policy discussion that can make their actions flexible depending on 
changing circumstances. Grassroots level groups may be able to mobilize a fairly large number 
of people, but they have much more trouble developing alternatives with high value. 
Nonetheless, actors who are highly central to these social networks play a key role in collation 
formation for two primary reasons: (1) actors with greater degree centrality and network size are 
connected more people who can reach more organizations, and (2) Bonacich's measure of 
centrality has been shown to be accurate at predicting power usage in experimental exchange 
networks (Borgatti and Everett 2006). Individuals who possess such power might do so by 
successfully coercing others to join their coalition. But again, the second factor of value, whether 
money or people, flows from the greater accumulation of valued alternatives. 
The following case studies with more complex coalitions combine these two forms of 
power resources through dependency and network centrality in coalitions. We make some 
assumptions to score the coalitions: (a) business has twice as many resources as the state or 
media, (b) local institutions are twice as strong as national groups in determining a local issue, 
( c) the state and media are twice as strong as the grass roots. A simple scoring scheme will be as 
follows: Bn=2, B1=4, Sn=l, S1=2, Mn=l, M1=2, GRn=0.5, and GR1=l. The total score is 13.5, 
which means that a winning coalition needs 7 or more to win. Since unified business scores a 6, 
they only need a small amount to reach 7. If business is split, then a larger coalition of the other 
groups is possible. These assumptions are somewhat arbitrary in this case, but they would be 
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derived from the balance of alternatives times values in determining available resources, and 
they generally reflect relative inequalities between these groups. The winning coalitions in two 
case studies along with two hegemonically determined case studies will be calculated from these 
scores, and they are listed at the bottom each section a, b, c and d in figure 3 .1 Cases a and c are 
hegemonically overdetermined, and cases b and d are discussed below. 
Two Case Studies 
Case 1- Buying the Water Company. Just a few days after 9/11 RWE-AG (a German 
based multi-national utility company (Rhenisch-Westfalischen Elektrizitiitswerks Aktien-
gesellschaft) bought American Water Works Inc. After RWE-AG bought Thames Water of the 
UK, it was the third largest water firm in the world. Ownership of the water company being in 
the city's best interest was one of the most central issues to the 2002 Mayoral race in Lexington. 
The non-partisan race for mayor of Lexington was between local politician and housing advocate 
Teresa Isaac and Attorney Scott Crosbie. Isaac refused money from an official political party and 
narrowly defeated Crosbie who accepted a $150,000 in-kind donation from the State Republican 
party and $1,000 Kentucky-America's president. Isaac would spend much of her next 4 years 
trying to exercise eminent domain over the water company. As a critic of Crosbie said in a local 
newspaper article, "This election is a referendum to show whether Lexington is a relatively 
liberal college town or a religious and conservative suburban community" (Cheves et al. 2002). 
The debate of the water company was also a polarizing factor in the debate. The water company 
issue played the significant role in the election probably because of public hostility toward 
German ownership of the water company (Cheves et al. 2002). 
1 These estimates are a shortcut for this article. Actual estimations of resource power would require listing 
alternatives and probabilities, and then summing up the expected values. 
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This idea to buy the private water company came from Chattanooga, Tennessee who 
attempted but failed to buy their water company. With xenophobia running high after 9/11, the 
debate was pushed forward by liberals who detested a huge conglomerate with a spotty 
envirornnental record. Many people feared a foreign company having control of Lexington's 
water supply. Two years later in January of 2003, American Water Works shareholders, the PSC 
and federal regulators approved the German buyout of the American company. 
Isaac would face a tough four year term as Lexington's mayor. The battle over the water 
company quickly became framed as a debate between "big government" practicing eminent 
domain vs. private business. Local groups with some assistance from national envirornnental 
organizations, such as Green Corps a non-profit organization offering internships and training in 
envirornnental activism, attempted to aid in the mobilization of Lexington residents for local 
ownership. Meanwhile RWE-AG spent large amounts of capital to change public relations with 
its firm and fund opposition to the city's bid. The Republicans fought a public vote on the matter 
because eminent domain was an ideological threat to free enterprise. Eventually the Kentucky 
Supreme Court blocked a public vote in November of 2005. 
Two items related to our theory are important. First, the local business elite shifted from 
supporting public ownership to being split by a coalition of well-resourced business leaders who 
were in favor of stopping public ownership. Reporter Andy Mead (2006) said that the supporters 
of local ownership were older, Lexington elites, but those against city control were the residents 
of newer neighborhoods. The older elites had little contact with the newcomers in South 
Lexington, and they could not persuade the growing 'new money' south side that was much 
more pro-business. The newcomers opposed condenmation by "big government." One prominent 
representative against city ownership was the Vice-mayor Mike Scanlon, who as a constant and 
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highly vocal opponent of most oflsaac's proposals. He owned a restaurant franchise and even 
proposed privatizing the city/county waste management system. While his influence is not 
enough to say that the local state was split, but it is symbolic of how the local business 
community became fractured. This gradual shift of power in Lexington from "old money" to 
"new money"split the business community on the issue. 
Second, the RWE-AG was a peculiar private firm with limited alternatives because the 
water company could not threaten the city by saying that it would move to another location and 
the Fayette county would lose jobs and taxes. The water company was tied to its customers and 
could not leave the area without losing its raison d'etre for existence - selling water to the local 
residents (see Molotoch and Logan, 2007, on utilities). Consequently, its alternatives were 
severely limited. 
A petition overruled the court decision preventing a vote, and the buyout of the water 
company was put on the ballot for general elections of 2006. The result was an overwhelming 
"no" to local ownership. This was largely credited to the Water Company and its supporters 
framing of the debate and resources in sustaining a long battle over the issue versus the city. 
Many supporters had also tired of the issue being dragged out for five years, and these former 
supporters were disillusioned. The issue had dominated Isaac's term and her other missteps led 
to declining local support. Thus, the battle became costly to the city budget and to Isaac's 
political support. She was a vulnerable opponent for the 2006 mayoral race. Running on a pro-
business platform opposed to the water company buyout, Jim Newberry won the election by the 
largest margin since Lexington had a city-county merger in 1980. 
In terms of our network coalition model in figure 3, the proposal to buy the water 
company initially had a lot of coalition support (S1 +B1 + GRn + GR1+ M1) from the city 
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government, grass roots groups, and the media. In our scoring system, it had 2+4+ 1 +0.5+2 or 
8.5, which is a winning coalition given the resource weights. It was opposed by national 
business interests and ideological tenor of the Bush Administration (Bn + Gn + Mn with a score of 
4). But business became split and as the debate became more acrimonious, the local media tired 
of the issue and became negative. This shifted the power of the coalitions in the opposite 
direction. The pro-purchase coalition (S1 +Bia+ GRn + GR,) dropped to a score of 5.5 and the 
anti-purchase coalition (Bn + Gn +Mn+ M1) rose to 8. The split in local business divided their 
score to 2 for the pro-purchase and 2 for the anti-purchase groups. The scoring results in a 
defeated with 5.5 < 8 with local business being split. This example shows how the local 
networks of the state and grass-roots could opposed corporate interests of a weakened private 
corporation with few alternatives (i.e., you can't threaten to leave your water customers). In a 
less pro-business national context (e.g., under the early President Obama's administration instead 
of President Bush's), this effort may have succeeded. 
Case 2 - Developing Centre Pointe. In March, 2008 a new development project was 
launched Lexington to build a $250 million Centre Pointe Project. It was to be a 40-story 
building in the heart of Lexington's downtown. This building would house a four-star hotel, 
luxury condominiums, and retail stores. Construction required destruction of a block of buildings 
dating back to 1826 called Morton's Row. The Webb Company was the developer for this 
project and they came from a wealthy Kentucky family that has a very public and checkered past 
with the city of Lexington. Two past dealings had received wide coverage and shaped the 
Webb's image to many residents of Lexington: the defunct Kentucky Central Life Insurance 
Company and the Festival Market. The first project went bankrupt, and the second project never 
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turned a profit despite using a 2.1 million dollar loan from the city, which the Webbs were able 
to escape. 
Ibis Centre Pointe project was contrary to a two-year long $500,000 "Downtown Master 
Plan" developed by the Downtown Development Authority. The eventual plan for 
"revitalization" for Lexington's downtown called for more residential housing, limits on building 
height, two-way (instead of one-way streets), development that would 'connect' the University 
of Kentucky basketball arena with downtown, and also making the area more pedestrian and 
cyclist friendly. The plan was well-received by many local developers and neighborhood groups 
alike. Local real-estate developers stood to make large profits off of city supported development 
in the downtown area. Neighborhoods close to the downtown area stood to gain from higher 
property values and use values associated with having 'vital' downtown. This also solidified a 
plan to "build Lexington up not out" a mantra that was converted into bumper stickers and highly 
defended by the wealthy horse farmers outside of metro Lexington. The Webb's claimed that 
since the city council had failed to enact the entire plan, it was not binding and could therefore be 
ignored. Critics on the city council called the plan a failure because the developers were able to 
ignore it, especially in planning Centre Pointe. 
Coalitions formed amongst organizations and individuals to oppose and to support the 
new project. Business organizations such as Lexington's Chamber of Commerce (B1) tended to 
,1.,,"1\,~1,_~ 
. '" "' support the Webb's. The Mayor~ was one of the most vocal supporters of Centre Pointe and 
staked a lot of his public opinion on the debate. Many actually felt that the decision to build was 
largely a closed process between the Webbs and the Mayor. Fueling this was a blogger's posting 
that the Webbs and their business partners donated about $13,000 into Newberry's mayoral 
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campaign. The city council while not unanimous tended to follow the Mayor's lead. But how did 
the other local groups coalesce on this issue? 
In Lexington many social groups exist among horse farmers and other groups that are 
against urban expansion and "the destruction of bluegrass forever" (a popular bumper sticker). 
These preservation groups come in the form of organizations with many elite members from the 
community who can make sizeable financial donations and sit on the boards of directors of non-
profits and some banks. They often hold fundraisers that garner support from others, especially 
financial donations and promises of political support. However, these preservation groups had 
two problems. 
First, the "Bluegrass Forever" environmental group was not threatened by a downtown 
project and they were largely silent on the debate. These groups also have many overlaps with 
the Chamber of Commerce and other prestigious charitable boards to which many of Lexington's 
business community belong. These organizations frame many of their goals in environmental 
terms, but the destruction of a city block and extensive new construction was hardly a green 
undertaking, even with an environmental building certification. But unlike the water company 
issue, Bluegrass Forever remained on the side lines during the debate because the issue did not 
directly affect them. The preferred targeting rural expansion rather than urban infill. 
Second, there were other problems with coalition building with the two other 
environmental preservation groups - the Bluegrass Trust and Preserve Lexington. The block 
scheduled for demolition included "The Dame," which was the most popular live music venue 
for college students in the city. Young students joined Preserve Lexington rather than the 
Bluegrass Trust, which consisted mainly of long-time Lexington residents who were not 
interested in a late-night rock and punk music venue. Further, student housing needs in the city 
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often threatened the Bluegrass Trust's interest in preserving quiet neighborhoods. In other words, 
loud music and rowdy parties did not mix with preserving quiet and charming neighborhoods. 
With Bluegrass Forever on the sidelines, Preserve Lexington and Bluegrass Trust both 
opposed the construction of Centre Pointe but in very different ways. Preserve Lexington 
engaged in direct action and protest events like "Block Aid." Eventually, they sued and delayed 
the build. Preserve Lexington wrote letters to the paper but avoided other action. The two groups 
collaborated little. With the eventual destruction of the block, the building of new bars, the 
relocation of some of the old ones in the revitalization of the distillery district, interest waned. 
And at the end of the school year with student leaving for home, Preserve Lexington halted their 
direct action and the Bluegrass Forever simply wrote letters to the editor. 
In terms of our model in figure 3, the numbers of coalition partners were the same as the 
previous model. The "yes coalition" on Centre Point (Bn+B1+Sn +S1+ M1) with a score of 10 was 
clearly greater than the "no coalition" (GRn + GR1 + Mn) with a score of 3.5. Not only were the 
more powerful coalition members were in the yes camp rather, but the opposition coalition was 
consisted only of grass roots groups possibly bolstered by national media (see Figure 2, part c ). 
Business was united rather than split, and so was the larger government (i.e., Senators) though 
national government was not very much involved. Further, the alternatives of business were 
much greater than with the Water Company. Centre Pointe would create many jobs, and the 
Webbs could have easily taken their money and gone to any of a thousand locations throughout 
the country. That they picked Lexington in the first place was due to their 'loyalty' to the area 
-
(plus the pull that they may also have locally). Thus, when business and government are united 
and on the same side, grass roots groups will have a difficult time. 
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Conclusion 
In many ways, theory is like a flashlight in the dark. It can be used to shine light into 
areas that are not often observed. The model proposed in this paper shines this light in three 
different directions to measure power: 
I -According to social network theory, this synthetic theory focuses on the social 
networks of actors and how these social networks lead to more or less eigenvector 
centrality, which can be measured at 2nd and 3rd order connections (like a football 
strength of schedule measure). But this centrality then needs to lead to the measurement 
of resources in terms of more or fewer valued-alternatives and networked coalitions. A 
further challenge of this method is to find the strengths or weaknesses of 2nd and 3rd order 
network connections. 
2-According to power dependency theory, this synthetic theory focuses on specific 
alternatives and their attached resources and indicates that power resources come from 
these alternatives. But subjective probabilities about alternatives are shaped, hidden or 
accentuated by considerable framing, persuasion and even chicanery. A further challenge 
of this method is actually calculating alternatives, probabilities and sunnning expected 
values. 
3-According to power resources and coalition theory, this synthetic theory puts these 
networks and alternatives into a measurement scheme for coalitions to observe how local 
coalitions win or lose political issues due to their accumulation or lack of power. We did 
not go as far as to estimate all the alternatives and the probabilities that are associated 
with them, but the theory points toward further specification of these elements of a more 
detailed theory of power. 
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This synthetic approach avoids the view that business always wins with an overly structuralist 
and deterministic approach (as item a in Figure 3 was avoided), but at the same time, it indicates 
that business has a distinct advantage rooted in power resources and dependency. Mobilization 
of these resources requires social networks which are both a resource and a pathway for 
resources to travel through. By better understanding how ties develop between individuals and 
subsequently organizations that seek to influence political processes it serves to better understand 
the development and maintenance of power within these networks. 
By synthesizing social networks into the broader discussion of power into sociology we 
hope to enrich the discourse and provide promising avenues for the future examination of power. 
Power is a subject that is critical in both social network analysis and political sociology yet both 
fields tend to run parallel to one another. With the theory proposed in this paper we hope to 
merge some of these discussions. This is important because many sociologists criticize social 
network analysis as atheoretical. This criticism at times is warranted, yet for sociologist to 
dismiss such powerful analysis altogether is "throwing the baby out with the bathwater". 
But this theory can be developed further. While we have provided some aspects 
changing coalitions, especially with the Water Company case, it is clear that power relations 
develop through a process where resources can decay or grow, and alternatives may appear or 
disappear. Putting the development of political power into this process approach will continue 
the effort to go beyond mere structural differences in resources. Also the tactical interaction in 
framing and presenting issues and alternatives is a major tactical and possibly strategic issue. 
Finally, one can conceive of a contingency theory such that power resources theory may 
be stronger when ideas are stable and parties can gain more representatives through their voters. 
On the other hand, power dependency theory may be stronger where new alternatives are 
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available that can convert opponents into supporters (not usually representatives, but certainly 
voters who may switch parties or sides). And social networks may be stronger in predicting 
power if 2nd and 3rd order nodes prove to be central in their networks ( e.g., a comparison of 
Obama and Clinton's campaign organizational networks using the strength of schedule example). 
While we are proposing a theoretical synthesis rather than a contingency theory, the possibility 
that facets of this theory have different strengths or weaknesses given new contexts is enticing. 
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Yes 
Figure 3: Coalitions and Networks of Political Actors 
<< 
> or< means one coalition wins behaviorally over the other, 




















3 << 10.5 8.5 > 4 ---> 5.5 < 8 
Before local B split After local B split 
a. Hegemonically defeated (never proposed): b. Contested: Proposed & near) ass_ed 
"" Effort of the local gave nt to condemn ', Local business would join large coalition against 
national business in building large Mall in and buy the privately o ed Water Company ' 
in horse country (North of Lexington in horse 
farm area). 
comes close to passing bu ils with early _) 
local capital support (which then sp its: Bia, B1b) 
and media support (which switches sides). 
Yes No Yes No 
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12 >> 1.5 10 > 3.5 
c. Hegemonically passed (no opposition) 
Local and national business builds a large mall 
in a greenfield location not in horse country 
near I-75 called Hamburg Pavilion. 
d. Little contest: Proposed . 
Effort of business to build t e Centre Pointe 
hotel complex in downtowriand 









Local business in the horse and other industries (score=4) 
With a split: B1a=horse industry=2, and B1b=South Lexington noveau riche=2. 
Big business capital of developers and bankers (score=2) 
Local city-county government (score=2) 
State and national government (score= 1) 
Local grass roots social movements (score=l) 
State and national grass roots environmental groups (score=0.5) 
Local media of newspapers and TV (score=2) 
National and state of Kentucky media (score=l) 
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